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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
On July 1, 2014, the trial court entered judgment against Chadley Keith Calvert 
for Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103(1995) and 
Threatening Or Using A Dangerous Weapon In A Fight, a class A misdemeanor, Utah 
Code Ann. 76 - 10 - 506. R. 231-233. The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment, is 
attached as Addendum A. Calvert did not timely appeal, but filed a Motion to Reinstate 
the Time for Appeal. R. 237 - 241. The court granted Calvert's Motion to Reinstate the 
Time to File Notice of Appeal. R. 273 - 274. From that final Order Calvert filed a 
timely Notice Of Appeal. R.276 - 277. This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 
t;, Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e)(2012). 
Gi) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Was defense counsel ineffective during trial in failing to move to merge 
the Threatening with a Dangerous Weapon conviction into the Aggravated Assault? 
Standard of review: Ineffective assistance of counsel questions require a 
showing that counsel's performance was deficient, "that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness" and that the defendant was prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Merger questions are reviewed for legal 
correctness. State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, P26, 128 P.3d 1179. 
Preservation: Unpreserved claims before the trial court are reviewed for plain 
error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ,r 28, 
~ 276 P.3d 1207, 1218 
1 
Issue II: Did defense counsel's failure to move at sentencing that the Threatening 
Or Using A Dangerous Weapon charge be merged with the Aggravated Assault ~ 
(dangerous weapon) constitute ineffective assistance of counsel? 
Standard of Review: Ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question 
of law and fact. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,I 56, 150 P.3d 480, 502. "An 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a 
question oflaw." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,I 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
Preservation: Unpreserved claims before the trial court are reviewed for plain 
error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ,I 28, 
276 P.3d 1207. 
Issue III: Did the court err in granting the State's 404(b) Motion? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule 404(b) 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Lowther, 2015 UT App 180, ,I 
8, 356 P.3d 173. 
Preservation: The State filed a motion to admit prior acts of the defendant 
pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 404(b). R.93-108. The defendant opposed the motion. 
R.115-127. The State's Motion was granted in part and denied in part. R.154;R.282:30. 
The State called one 404(b) witness. R.282:287-299. 
Issue IV: Did providing the prosecutor's laptop computer to the jury constitute 
structural error? Did trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's laptop computer 
being supplied to the jury during deliberations constitute structural error? <& 
2 
Standard of Review: Denial of the right to a jury is a "structural defec[t] in the 
• constitution of the trial mechanism, which deflies] analysis by 'harmless-error' 
standards." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302. 
The deprivation of counsel during trial proceedings is a structural error. Johnson v. 
United States, 520 U.S. 461,469, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997). 
Preservation: At the close of all the evidence, the State offered its laptop 
computer to play a CD which was in evidence. R.284:147. No objection to that 
procedure was raised by the defense. Id. Prior to sentencing the defendant moved for 
arrest of judgment, Utah Rule Crim. P. 23. R. 204 - 220. The court denied the motion. 
(i R.238:21. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rules, statutes and constitutional provisions relevant to this appeal are included at 
AddendumB. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
~ 
The State filed an Information charging Calvert with Aggravated Assault 
(Dangerous Weapon), Utah Code Ann. 76 - 5 - 103 (1), a third degree felony; and 
<il Threatening with or Using a Dangerous Weapon in a Fight or Quarrel, Utah Code Ann 76 
- 10 - 506, a class A misdemeanor. R.1-3. Mr. Calvert waived preliminary hearing with 
the consent of the State and the court bound the defendant over for trial on both charges. 
i) R. 21 - 22. Defendant entered pleas of not guilty to the charges as alleged in the 
3 
Information. R. 31 - 33. The State filed a motion in limine to admit prior acts of the 
defendant pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 404(b ). R. 93 - 108. The defendant opposed the 
motion. R. 115 - 127. Oral argument was heard prior to trial. R.282:6-30. 
The court granted in part and denied in part the State's Motion. R.282:30;R.154. 
Trial was held April 30, 2014 through May 1, 2014. R. 154-162; R.282, 284. The 
jury found the defendant guilty as to both counts. R.161, 170; R.166,167; R.284:149. 
Calvert made a Motion For Arrest Of Judgment, on the basis, inter alia, that the 
prosecutor's laptop computer was taken to the jury room at the time of their deliberations. 
Utah Rule Crim. P. 23, R. 204-214. The State filed an Objection to Calvert's Motion . 
R.222-228. The parties argued the Motion to Arrest Judgment. R.238:1-20. The court 
denied the Motion. R.283 :20-21. 
The court sentenced the defendant on July 1, 2014 to the indeterminate term of 
zero to five years in prison on the Aggravated Assault, suspended, and 365 days in jail on 
the Threatening or Using a Dangerous weapon, all but 275 days suspended, inter alia, 
upon serving 90 days jail and 36 months probation. R.238:21-26;R.231-233. 
The defendant filed a Motion to Reinstate the Appeal Time. R.237-231. The 
State opposed the Motion. R.242-250. The matter was heard and the court entered a 
final Order granting the Motion on December 18, 2014. R.271-272. Calvert timely 
appealed January 5, 2015. R.276-277. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. State's Case. 
4 
• 
The circumstances of this case involve a birthday party for Hugo Holguin at the 
• home of then 13 year old Anthony Canales, and his neighbor, Hugo, and Yolanda 
Trujillo, on July 16, 2012. R.282:91-92,101,144,258. Yolanda and Hugo lived at 6674 
So. 5500 W., West Jordan for 16 years. R.282:252. Hugo's brother Adon was present, 
along with a lot of young and teen aged children. R282:230, 253. 
• 
The children walked or rode their bicycles in the vicinity of Calvert's property, at 
6656 S. 5500 W. R.282:93,118,124,161,195;R,284:53. Depending on the witness 
testifying, the children present were aged anywhere from 3 to 16. R.282:124,161. 
Sixteen year old Kelsey Pitts testified that she and her friends were outside riding bikes 
and Calvert came outside his house, really upset and started yelling profanity at them and 
to get off his property. R.282:195. But they we were on the sidewalk. Id. Present were 
Araht, Karen Holguin, Andrew Holguin's little sister Vanessa, Anthony (Canales), and 
three or four year old Israel. Id. She attempted to apologize but he seemed to get more 
angry. Id. So they went to get the parents. Id. Calvert seemed to be yelling randomly, 
freaking them out. R.282:209. She saw nobody do anything on his property. Id. 
Araht testified that they were going to get bikes and heard him screaming. R.282: 
145. Andrew Holguin testified he was close by Calvert's House when he heard Calvert 
swearing, talking to his cousin, Araht, also swearing. R.282: 128. They all stopped 
because Calvert was using the F word, directed at Araht. R. 282: 119. Araht testified he 
told Calvert," don't be talking to little kids like that." R.282: 165. But Calvert told him 
(j) to shut the fuck up. Id. He said, "be quiet big boy," "before I kick your ass." R.282:145. 
5 
He told the kids to go back to their parents. Id. Araht testified the youngest child 
present was four or five, the oldest 15 when Calvert became really aggressive. 
R.282:146. So he went to get his parents and they came over. Id. 
After Araht left to get his parents, along with his uncle, Hugo, Adon, his dad, and 
aunt Yolanda, they walked back together. R.282:176. Calvert had a gun. R.282:175. 
Araht saw a laser pointing to the ground right outside Calvert's house. R.282:177. Araht 
observed a laser pointing and threatening Hugo, who was trying to get Calvert to put his 
gun down. R.282:178. Adon was there, saw Hugo get mad, and tried to calm him down. 
Id. Araht maintained that Hugo got mad, but was not drunk, and that "No one had been 
drinking that day." R.282:179. Testimony is conflicting on that point, however, as ~ 
Anthony Canales had previously testified that Hugo was pretty drunk. R.282: 102. 
Adon Holguin, Araht's dad, R.282:169, testified he was at his brother, Hugo's, 
house, having a peaceful party when the kids came and said a person was screaming at 
them. R.282:231. Hugo went out, then older kids came and said there was a man with a 
gun. Id. So Adon walked with Hugo over to Calvert's house. Id. They were talking, 
and "I took Hugo and I asked him to go-just go back to his house." He asked Hugo's 
wife to take him home and have Hugo call 911. Id. 
According to Adon, Calvert was initially calm but nervous, chatting peacefully. 
R.282:232. While Adon was standing on the sidewalk, Calvert told him the kids had 
gone into his garage and destroyed his property. Id. Suddenly Calvert changed his 
attitude, saying twice he was done talking. Id. He noticed something under Calvert's • 
6 
• 
ann, but didn't know what and Calvert said three times he was done talking and was 
• going to bring out his dogs. R.282:233. Calvert continued demanding he leave or 
"things are going to go down." R.282:235. At that point he noticed the laser pointing 
halfway between the two of them going back and forth. Id. Calvert continued 
threatening them to leave or things are going to get really bad, with a "big mess" to 
"clean up on floor." Id. Adon told him he didn't have to leave as he wasn't on his 
property. Id. 
In the meantime, as his dad and uncle were in front of Calvert's garage, Araht 
called the police on his cell phone from two houses down. R.282: 149. He said Calvert 
• pointed a gun with a laser at them. R.282: 151. He infonned dispatch that Calvert went 
inside with the gun when he was told they were calling the cops. R.282:155. 
Hugo Holguin testified that when he approached the house on the sidewalk, 
conceding "maybe both said bad words," that Calvert was offensive and told him to leave 
and go to hell. R.282:254. Calvert had a gun in his hand, and when Hugo asked him 
what happened, he pointed it toward his chest. Id. He put the laser on him for probably 
30 seconds. Id. Contrary to Yolanda's testimony that no one had drunk any alcohol that 
day, R.282:279-280, Hugo testified that he had had 2 or 3 beers. R.282:255. Adon also 
testified to having one or two beers. R.282:238. 
Yolanda testified that when they approached Calvert's property the first thing she 
heard was Calvert saying get the F off my property and go back to your F-ing house. 
R.282:281. She saw a gun in his hand and a red laser dot. Id. Calvert was moving the 
7 
laser around and pointed at Hugo several times. R.282:265. At first the gun was at his 
waist and then it was pointed at Hugo's chest, which is when she got scared and told 
Hugo to go back to the house and both him and Araht to call 911. R.282:282. Hugo was 
as angry as she had ever seen him. R.282:285. Hugo did not talk long, then left with 
Yolanda to go back to the house while Adon was still talking to Calvert. R.282:283. 
Adon stayed and tried to maintain talking to him until police arrived. When police 
arrived Calvert ran in to the garage and deposited the gun. R.282:236. Adon testified 
Calvert never pointed gun at him, just threatened him, moving the gun up and down 
insisting he should leave the property or things would get ugly. R.282:246. He said he 
felt threatened, but didn't leave because Calvert was doing something wrong. Id. 4& 
The State put on a witness, Camille Little, for Utah R. Evid., Rule 404(b) 
purposes. Her testimony will be discussed in Point II. 
What role alcohol played in this misadventure is unclear from the various 
positions taken. Bryan Majors, a former neighbor of Mr. Calvert, testified that one of the 
men he observed, presumably either Hugo or Adon, the individual he saw step off 
Calvert's driveway, seemed intoxicated by his mannerisms, the way he was walking and 
talking. R.284: 16-17, 24. The individual acted like he wanted to fight Chad, sounding 
angry, loud and hostile. R.284:25. • 
B. Defense Case 
Mr. Calvert testified that a couple of days prior to the incident he had had a triple 
neurectomy involving three nerves from groin to back to thigh. R.284:54. He was doing 
8 
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alright that night, just experiencing pain and discomfort from sutures and surgery. Id. At 
• roughly 10:30 p.m. he was awakened by his two Rottweilers barking in the basement. 
• 
QI) 
R.284:55. When he looked outside he saw a bunch of children causing all sorts of ruckus 
in his front yard. Id. The children were tall and big, but not adults. One was hanging in 
his tree bending the limbs down on top of his vehicle, bouncing up and down scratching 
the hood. Id. So he told them to get out of the tree. Id. The children started yelling at 
him, one picked up something and threw it at him, and there was a verbal shouting match. 
R.284:56. One was shouting profanities, as was he. Id. Calvert was upset about the 
damaging of his property and the kid came unglued. Id. Calvert remained on the porch. 
e Id. They slowly left and Calvert went back in his house through the garage, grabbed a 
flashlight and went to check out his property. Id. When he got to the comer of his 
property, a sprinkler had been uprooted and broken and he started fixing it. Id. At that 
• 
• 
time, two young ladies approached him and said they were sorry. Id. He said he took 
pride in his yard, they were vandalizing his stuff, it is 10:30 at night, and they should be 
home. R.284:57. They said they were sorry and walked away. Id . 
Calvert went inside after fixing the sprinkler, grabbed a burrito came back out on 
his porch and was eating. R.284:57. Laying on an angle on the porch because of the 
surgery, he heard a scuffle behind him, turned around and somebody was trying to reach 
through his railing to grab him. Id. This scared him, he jumped up, went back in, alarms 
went off, and the garage alarm went off, indicating someone's presence. Id. He did not 
know who reached for him. R.284:58. 
9 
The alarm system indicates the part of the house or garage penetrated through 
motion detectors. R.284:59. When he went out to fix the sprinkler, he opened the garage • 
door, leaving it open. Id. The alarm going off indicated somebody was in the garage. Id. 
It does not stop unless whoever is present removes himself from the garage. R.284:60. 
At that point, the alarm still going off, Mr. Calvert ran into the house, shut the 
door, called Brian Majors, and said he had an "incident" and needed help. R.284:61. He 
told Bryan he was going to get his gun. Id. He then went upstairs to the third floor and 
retrieved the firearm from his gun safe. Id. The alarm was still going off, indicating 
someone's presence remaining in the garage. Id. The basement door alarm had not gone 
off, so he knew no one had penetrated the house itself. Id. He opened the basement door 
and "there is a gentleman three feet, right there standing in my garage. Pitch black." Id. 
The laser had already been turned on. Id. Calvert told him to get out of his garage and 
off his property. R.284:62. He had never before seen the man, who put his hands up, 
which made Calvert feel a bit safer, and started backing out of the garage. R.284:62,65. 
The man backed down the driveway, and halfway down Calvert holstered his handgun, a 
Glock 27 with a laser, locking it in a "paddle," a type of locking secure holster, with the 
laser still on. R.284:62, 77. Calvert believed it was understandable with the paddle at his 
side as he moved around that someone would testify that it was jumping around on the 
ground. Id. 
As Calvert reached the threshold of his garage, another man was standing in the 
darkness to his left and yet another at his right. R.284:63,80. Also there was a man 
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standing in front by the tree. Id. Calvert did not know them, one was speaking Spanish, 
(j/} and he did not leave the confines of the garage. Id. He had called his friend, Bryan, 
asking him to call the police, and he could see Brian across the street. R.284:66-67. 
Bryan was the closest person to him, and although there were people around at that point 
they started to dissipate except for the man in front of him who was not leaving. 
R.284:67. Calvert just kept saying get off my property, leave, and Brian was saying the 
same thing. Id. Some people approached Brian and he told them to back off and go 
home. Id. Brian was very loud which seemed to take the heat off with everyone 
knowing he was on the phone with 911. R.284:68. The police showed up shortly after 
that. Id. 
Calvert had not shut the garage when the police arrived. They went to Brian's 
house, and immediately the "shadows" started going away heading back toward their 
property. R.284:69. Calvert took his paddle and firearm out of his shorts and set it on his 
four wheeler. R.284:69,80. It accidentally fell and hit the floor, so he unlocked and 
removed it from the paddle, setting it on the foot peg of the four wheeler. R.284:69,81. 
Officers came up and Calvert told them the story about the gentleman trying to 
grab him. R.284:70. They indicated it appeared to be self-defense and sounded justified. 
• Id. Other officers were talking to the intruders, those that were causing the problem, 
more or less to corral them and get them to go back to their house. Id. They got them out 
of his yard and officer Jex pulled up. Id. He approached and asked Calvert where all his 
guns were and how many he had. Id. Calvert said he did not need to tell them where or 
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how many guns he had, at which point Jex immediately put Calvert in handcuffs and said 
okay do not step off of your property. R.284:70,82. 
Officer Jex told him he could not go in his house, that he was calling animal 
control and applying for a search warrant. R.284:71. Calvert was flabbergasted after 
having talked to the two other officers. Id. After putting Calvert in handcuffs Jex went 
and talked to the other people then came back and uncuffed him for some reason. Id. Jex 
said he would screen the case with the prosecutor's office. Id. Nevertheless, Jex was still 
going to apply for a search warrant and take his animals. R.284:72. With that 
information, Calvert gave him consent to search and conveyed information about his 
firearms, walked Jex into the bedroom, showed him where the gun safe was and other 
firearms he wanted to know about. Id. Calvert consented as he had nothing to hide. Id. 
Calvert indicated he had never met Hugo Holguin before this trial. R.284:74. He 
could have been the man that night but it was too dark to tell. R.284:82. He did not deny 
having a gun when asked by Officer Jex, but never talked to him about a laser. Id. He 
told Officer Jex the Glock was loaded, that the kids were damaging his property, 
specifically the tree, and Jex again arrested Calvert. R.284:84. He told Officer Jex he 
initially had a flashlight. R.284:89. The gun should have been loaded, but upon their 
inspection, Calvert was surprised it was not. Id. The defense rested. R.284:90. 
C. State's Rebuttal. 
Officer Jex was recalled and commented on Mr. Calvert's testimony. He said 
Calvert had mentioned his tree being damaged and was worried that the tree would touch 
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his car but mentioned no damage. R.284:92. He talked about his yard, not recalling the 
(I) sprinkler, but conceding he might have. R.284:92,94. Calvert did not mention someone 
grabbing him through the railing, or anyone in the garage. Id. That would have changed 
his approach as it would have been investigated as a residential burglary. R.284:93,97. 
• 
The State thereupon rested. 
Each of the parties gave closing arguments. R.284:129-144. The bailiff was 
sworn and jury excused for deliberation. R.284: 144-146. The State indicated that the 
jury would need some way of listening to the CD, which was a recording of Araht' s 911 
call, State's Exhibit 2. R.283:157;R.284:146. The State indicated, "I have got a laptop if 
they - if they need it." R.284: 147. Defense counsel made no objection to the 
prosecutor's laptop going to the jury. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. At trial, defense counsel should have moved, no later than at the close of all 
the evidence, to either dismiss one of the two charges, Threatening With a Dangerous 
Weapon or Aggravated Assault, merge the lesser threatening charge into the greater 
assault, or request a jury instruction that Threatening With a Dangerous Weapon is a 
lesser included offense of Aggravated Assault (2012). Failure to take any action was 
ineffective assistance of counsel subjecting Mr. Calvert to double convictions and 
sentences for the same conduct. 
2. Defense counsel was ineffective at the time of sentencing for failing to 
move to merge the conviction for Threatening With A Dangerous Weapon into the 
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aggravated assault. 
3. As only one isolated instance of an alleged prior bad act was presented, the 
"doctrine of chances" was inapplicable, and the trial court erred in admitting the evidence 
on that basis. Additionally, however, the trial court failed to conduct the necessary 
404(b) "scrupulous examination." Even had it done so, it would have been an abuse of 
discretion to admit this extrinsic evidence. Even if it were admissible, the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. 
4. It was a complete abdication of defense counsel in failing to object and 
deprivation of the right to counsel to allow the state's laptop computer to be utilized by 
• 
the jury during deliberations. It was a complete deprivation of the right to an impartial (j) 
jury to allow the state's laptop computer to be utilized by the jury during deliberations. 
The error constitutes a structural defect for which prejudice need not be shown to require 
reversal. The error being structural, the trial court erred in denying defendant's Motion 
To Arrest Judgment based upon the State's laptop being utilized by the jury during 
deliberations. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO MOVE, NO LATER THAN AT 
THE CLOSE OF ALL THE EVIDENCE, TO EITHER DISMISS ONE OF THE 
TWO CHARGES, MERGE THE LESSER CHARGE INTO THE GREATER, OR 
REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION THAT THREATENING WITH A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
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Analysis of this Point necessarily begins with the question of whether Threatening 
(t) with a Dangerous Weapon is, under the facts presented by the State, a lesser included 
offense. 
Several considerations come in to play. The single criminal episode statute, which 
is pertinent, at least to some extent, states, in its entirety, 
( 1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not 
be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An 
offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation 
to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
( c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
( 4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is 
sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that 
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included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or 
reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, 
without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (Emphasis added). The emphasized portions of the statute 
are relevant to a determination of whether counsel was ineffective and the defendant 
prejudiced as a result. 
One alternative rule, inapplicable in the instant matter, is that, when the prosecutor 
seeks to introduce a lesser-included offense, all of its elements must necessarily be 
included in the greater offense. This "more restrictive standard," the "necessarily-
included standard," is "limited to cases where the prosecution requests the instruction". 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983); accord State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 
118,,12-13, 62 P.3d 444. 
Different concerns are raised when the defense requests a lesser included offense 
instruction. Baker at 156. The defendant's right to a lesser included offense instruction is 
limited by the evidence presented at trial. Baker at 157 (Utah 1983 ). Baker rejected the 
'"mechanical comparison of statutory elements," concluding that although such a 
comparison "may be appealing in its promise of certainty and intellectual purity, .... its 
artificiality is unresponsive to the underlying purposes of the lesser included offense 
doctrine ... '' Baker at 158 quoting United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1238 (9th 
Cir. 1980). The evidence must provide the jury a "rational basis" to acquit on the greater 
offense and convict on the lesser. Baker at 158-59. "The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a 
16 
• 
• 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
• included offense." § 7 6-1-402( 4 ). When both parts of the Baker test are satisfied, a trial 
court must instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense. State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, 
,12, 152 P.3d 315 (remanding for a new trial when the trial court declined to instruct the 
jury on a lesser included offense); State v. Knight, 2003 UT App 3 54, , 17, 79 P .3d 969 
( explaining that "when an element of the crime . . . is in dispute, and the evidence is 
consistent with both the defendant's and the State's theory of the case, failing to instruct 
on the lesser included offense presumptively affects the outcome of the trial ... [ and] our 
• 
• 
• 
confidence in the verdict is undermined."). 
In State v. Oldroyd, 685 P .2d 551 (Utah 1984 ), the defendant was charged with 
Aggravated Assault using a gun in an altercation between his wife and him. The State's 
evidence differed from the defendant's. The State presented evidence that Oldroyd 
pointed a gun at a police officer witness. Id. at 552. Oldroyd denied that he had pointed 
the gun at the officer. Id. Oldroyd requested a lesser included offense of Threatening or 
Using a Dangerous Weapon, which request the trial court refused. Id. at 553. 
Employing the standards enunciated in State v. Baker, supra, the Supreme Court held that 
this was reversible error. Oldroyd at 556. 
The Court in Oldroyd reasoned that the elements of the two offenses sufficiently 
overlap to meet the first Baker requirement: "It is apparent that these two statutes have 
elements in common. Both require a form of threat and both require the use of a weapon . 
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Thus, the statutes do have overlapping elements, and the first segment of the Baker test 
has been met." State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 554. That analyses applies to this case. 
As to the second prong of Baker, "if there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to 
raise a jury question regarding a lesser offense, then the court should instruct the jury 
regarding the lesser offense." Baker at 159. The Court in Oldroyd found that, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, there was a rational basis for 
acquitting Oldroyd of aggravated assault and convicting him of threatening with a 
dangerous weapon. Oldroyd, at 555. Thus a lesser included instruction is appropriate 
when "the evidence is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, 
and one alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the 
lesser." Baker at 159. This is especially true when "the critical question is either the 
credibility of certain evidence or the determination of what inferences may legitimately 
be made on the basis of the evidence." Id. 
In this case, both the State and the defense produced evidence that could 
reasonably allow a jury to acquit Mr. Calvert of Aggravated Assault and instead convict 
him of Threatening With Or Using A Dangerous Weapon. The lesser-included offense 
would require proof that Mr. Calvert used a dangerous weapon "in a threatening or angry 
manner." This was supported by the prosecution's case that he was swearing, yelling, 
using the f word, and threatening, gun in hand, that if people didn't leave there would be 
a "mess" to clean up, etc. R.282: 119,128, 178, 235, 246,293-294. Under the evidence 
presented by Calvert, the elements of assault, essentially a threat of force or violence, 
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accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another 
using a gun, were not present, except perhaps as self-defense. The evidence at trial 
would have allowed a jury to reasonably acquit Calvert of Aggravated Assault and 
convict him of Threatening With Or Using A Dangerous Weapon. The discrepancies 
between the testimonies of Mr. Calvert and the internally conflicting testimony of the 
State's witnesses as to how he was using the gun would have "rationally" allowed the 
jury to convict him of the lesser offense while acquitting him of the greater. 
The legislature amended the Threatening statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506, 
effective May 13, 2014. The statute took effect subsequent to trial but prior to Mr. 
e Calvert's sentencing. By its amendment of section 2, adding the phrase, "and not 
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-103," it appears the legislature intended to 
codify the fact that under such circumstances as exist here, §76-10-506 is a lesser 
included offense of§ 76-5-103. This supports the argument made here. Both the 2012 
version and the current version of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-506 (as well as the 2012 and 
2015 versions of Aggravated Assault§ 76-5-103) are included in Addendum C. 
The next step of the analysis requires consideration of the issue of multiplicity. 
Once the facts were in, it should have been obvious to defense counsel that the 
Information was multiplicitous. Multiplicity is explained as follows: 
The problem of multiplicity arises when "a single offense [is charged] in 
several counts." Charles Alan Wright et al., 1 A Federal Practice & 
Procedure: Criminal § 142, at 10 ( 4th ed. 2008). The "rule against 
multiplicity ... 'is intended to prevent multiple punishments for the same 
act,"' thus guarding against double jeopardy by "'prohibit[ing] the 
Government from charging a single offense in several counts."' State v. 
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Morrison, 2001 UT 73, iJ 26, 31 P.3d 547 (emphases omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 729 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, if 10, 299 P.3d 625. The statutes themselves must be 
analyzed to determine, under the facts of the case, whether a charge is multiplicitous. 
The rule against multiplicity stems "from the 5th Amendment [Double 
Jeopardy Clause], which prohibits the Government from charging a single 
offense in several counts and is intended to prevent multiple punishments 
for the same act." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, iJ 24, 31 P .3d 54 7 
( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "'The test is whether the 
individual acts are prohibited, or the course of action which they constitute. 
If the former, then each act is punishable separately .... If the latter, there 
can be but one penalty."' Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302, 
52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932) ( omission in original) ( quoting 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 34 n.3 (11th ed.)). Thus, evaluation of a 
multiplicity claim requires analysis of the statutes under which a criminal 
defendant is charged. State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, ilil 16-17, 299 
P.3d 625. 
State v. Hattrich, 2013 UT App 177, iJ 33, 317 P.3d 433. In this instance, clearly the 
"course of conduct" as opposed to "individual acts" is what is prohibited. Therefore 
there can be "but one penalty." This is supported by State v. Oldroyd, at 554. It was 
there stated, 
The facts of this case tend to prove the elements of§ 76-10-506, as well as 
those of§ 76-5-103(1)(b). Assuming for the purposes of this analysis that 
the facts were as Officer Evans stated them to be, Oldroyd did point a gun 
(a dangerous or deadly weapon) at Evans. Use of the gun under the 
circumstances of this case could either constitute an assault with intention 
to do bodily harm, or the lesser offense of exhibition of a dangerous 
weapon in a threatening manner. Therefore, the facts tend to prove the 
elements of both statutory offenses. 
State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah 1984). That is precisely the circumstance 
presented in this case. 
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The State submitted its requested jury instructions. R.57-77. It requested certain 
• instructions related to Aggravated Assault and Threatening Or Using A Dangerous 
Weapon In A Fight Or Quarrel. R.67-68, 70-71, 74-77, as contained in Addendum D. 
Mr. Calvert filed a Motion to Modify the Government's Proposed Instructions, however 
• 
it contains no objection to simultaneously giving both an Aggravated Assault and a 
Threatening with a Dangerous Weapon as two separate charges to the jury. R.128-133. 
The instructions given by the court on these charges are virtually identical to the State's 
requested instructions. R.188-199, as contained in Addendum E. 
Defense counsel could have early on made a motion to deal with the multiplicity 
• of the Information. But until all the State's evidence was in, the court may not have been 
• 
in a position to rule decisively. However, at least as early as the close of the State's case 
or, at the latest, when all parties had rested, defense counsel had several options, none of 
which he exercised. He could have moved to dismiss one or the other of the two offenses 
charged. He could have requested that the court require the State to elect which of the 
charges it wished to go to the jury; to avoid multiple verdicts for the same conduct, 
multiplicity, the prosecution should have been required to elect upon which offense it 
would proceed. Counsel could have moved the court to dismiss the Threatening charge 
e and give it as a lesser-included offense instruction to the jury. He could have moved to 
merge the lesser Threatening with a Dangerous Weapon charge into the Aggravated 
Assault as the statute existed in 2012 (It was amended in 2015). Defense counsel did 
e, none of these things. 
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Defense counsel failed to take any action, thus subjecting Mr. Calvert to a 
conviction twice for essentially the same conduct. Defense counsel explicitly okayed the • 
Threatening elements instructions to these charges, in addition to the Aggravated Assault 
instruction, except for matters not relevant to this point. R.282: I 07, Defense counsel 
made no motions either prior to the jury being instructed or thereafter. R.284:319;282:97 
et seq., 148, 152. Nor did counsel file any post-conviction motions addressing the 
problem, not even a motion to merge at or prior to sentencing. 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, 
[A] defendant must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 
685 (Utah 1997). Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial--i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case. 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The first prong of the Strickland 
standard further requires that a defendant rebut the strong presumption that 
"under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound 
trial strategy."' Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 
100 L. Ed. 83, 76 S. Ct. 158 (1955)). 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,r 19, 12 P.3d 92. 
An "ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable 
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." State v. Thompson, 
2014 UT App 14, ,r 23, 318 P.3d 1221. In this case, counsel's failure cannot be 
considered strategy. He opted to do nothing in the face of a multiplicity of charges, 
causing his client to be subjected to conviction on two charges, at least one of which was 
avoidable. That was a failure to bring the skill and knowledge expected of defense 
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counsel. State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 533 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) quoting Strickland, 
Qi> 466 U.S. at 685, 104 S. Ct. at 2063 (1984). Counsel's performance "fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687. 
Because of counsel's failures, the jury convicted Mr. Calvert of two charges 
penalizing the same course of conduct, and for which he was doubly sentenced. R.231-
233. Counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial, satisfying the second prong of 
Strickland, i.e., it affected the outcome of the case. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 1 19, 
12 P.3d 92. As a direct consequence of these failures, confidence in the verdict is 
sufficiently undermined that this Court should grant a new trial. State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 
e 16, ,I 19, 179 P.3d 792; State v. Thompson, supra, ,I91. 
POINT II 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE AT THE TIME OF 
SENTENCING TO MERGE THE CONVICTION FOR THREATENING WITH A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON INTO THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
Counsel made no post-conviction motion to merge the threatening with a 
dangerous weapon charge into the aggravated assault. If trial counsel fails to request the 
consolidation of charges under the merger doctrine, and consolidation would be in order, 
trial counsel has failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. State v. Perez-Avila, 
2006 UT App 71, ,I 9, 131 P.3d 864, 868, citing State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, PP24-
26, 994 P.2d 1243; State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645-46 (Utah 1996); State v. Ross, 951 
P.2d 236, 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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As with the previous related Point, the motivating principle behind the merger 
doctrine is to prevent violations of constitutional double jeopardy protection. State v. 
Lopez, 2004 UT App 410, P8, 103 P.3d 153 ("Courts apply the merger doctrine as one 
means of alleviating the concern of double jeopardy that a defendant should not be 
punished twice for the same crime."); see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169, 53 L. 
Ed. 2d 187, 97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977) ("The [Double Jeopardy Clause] forbids successive 
prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser included offense."). 
The test applicable here is set forth in State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, 1 27, 128 P.3d 
1179, (2006), citing State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 1 23, 994 P.2d 1243 (Finlayson 
])("crimes may be so related that they must merge even though neither is a lesser 8 
included offense of the other under section 76-1-402," Lee at 1 31). This doctrine 
alleviates a concern of double jeopardy. Id.; State v. Lopez, 2004 UT App 410, 18, 103 
P.3d 153; State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,117, 55 P.3d 1131. The State must show the 
detention is "'significantly independent' from the detention inherent in the violent crime." 
State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, 130 (citing State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 
1981) and quoting Finlayson). This requires courts to "look beyond the statutory 
elements and compare the evidence" giving rise to the two crimes. Lee, 2006 UT 5, 
1131-32. Where the kidnapping charge and the underlying charge are "so [factually] 
related ... they must merge even though neither is a lesser included offense of the other." 
Id. 131. 
The statute dealing with included offenses is clear that, 
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(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the 
included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein ... 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. Only when an explicit indication of legislative intent is 
present in the specific offense statute will it be considered appropriate to exempt that 
statute from operation of the general merger requirements in section 76-1-402(3 ). State 
v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ,r 11, 122 P.3d 615. This "plain language analysis is also 
consistent with the constitutionally guaranteed double jeopardy interests that section 76-
1-402(3) was designed to protect." Id. 
As stated above, regarding the issue of the lesser included offense, when a 
defendant is charged with Threatening With Or Using A Dangerous Weapon and 
Aggravated Assault, the elements of the two offenses sufficiently overlap to meet the first 
requirement: "It is apparent that these two statutes have elements in common. Both 
require a form of threat and both require the use of a weapon. Thus, the statutes do have 
overlapping elements, and the first segment of the Baker test has been met." State v. 
Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah 1984) . 
As to the second prong of requirement, "if there is a sufficient quantum of 
evidence to raise a jury question regarding a lesser offense, then the court should instruct 
the jury regarding the lesser offense." Baker at 159. The instruction must be given when 
"the evidence is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and 
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one alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the lesser." 
Id. This is especially true when "the critical question is either the credibility of certain 
evidence or the determination of what inferences may legitimately be made on the basis 
of the evidence." Id. In this case, there was evidence that could reasonably allow a jury 
to acquit Mr. Calvert of aggravated assault and instead convict him of threatening with or 
using a dangerous weapon. The lesser-included offense would require proof that Mr. 
Calvert used a dangerous weapon "in a threatening or angry manner." This was well 
supported by the prosecution's own evidence. 
Ultimately, paraphrasing from other cases not involving these specific statutes, to 
deny merger the State must show that Threatening With A Dangerous Weapon is 
"significantly independent" from the Aggravated Assault. See State v. Mecham, 2000 
UT App 247, ,I30 (citing State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1981). This requires 
courts to "look beyond the statutory elements and compare the evidence" giving rise to 
the two crimes. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ,r,r3 I-32. Where the aggravated assault and the 
threatening charge are "so [factually] related ... they must merge even though neither is 
a lesser included offense of the other." Id. ,I31. Ultimately, the question is whether 
Threatening With A Dangerous Weapon is sufficiently independent of the Aggravate 
Assault to justify a separate conviction for Threatening With A Dangerous Weapon. Id. 
,II 130, 32. In this case it is not. 
Utilizing the test for ineffective assistance of counsel as set forth in the previous 
Point, it is evident that defense counsel failed to employ the skill and expertise expected. 
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State v. Classon, 935 P.2d at 533. Such failure prejudiced Mr. Calvert, subjecting him to 
Ci double punishment for the same crime where it was obvious the convictions merged. 
• 
State v. Perez-Avila, supra, 131 P.3d 864, 19. 
As a consequence of counsel's ineffective assistance, the trial court failed to 
merge the convictions under the foregoing tests. This Court should reverse and remand 
for the trial court to do so. This Court, however, has authority to do so based upon Utah 
R.Crim. P. 22(e). See State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, 19, 232 P.3d 1008, 1011. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE INAPPLICABLE "DOCTRINE OF 
CHANCES" DOCTRINE, FAILED TO CONDUCT THE NECESSARY 404(b) 
"SCRUPULOUS EXAMINATION," AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN ADMITTING EXTRINSIC "BAD ACT" EVIDENCE. IN EITHER 
EVENT THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF THE ALLEGED PRIOR 
BAD ACT OUTWEIGHED ITS PROBATIVE VALUE. 
This Court recently explained the basic principals underlying admission of 
404(b) evidence under the "doctrine of chances:" 
In reviewing a motion to admit prior bad acts under rule 404(b ), a trial 
court must make three inquiries. A "trial court must first determine whether 
the bad acts evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, 
such as one of those specifically listed in rule 404(b)." Nelson-Waggoner, 
2000 UT 59, 1 18, 6 P.3d 1120. Next, "the court must determine whether 
the bad acts evidence meets the requirements of rule 402 [ of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence], which permits admission of only relevant evidence." Id. 1 
19. The doctrine of chances "is a theory of logical relevance that rests on 
the objective improbability of the same rare misfortune befalling one 
individual over and over," State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, 147, 296 P.3d 673 
( citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and therefore, the doctrine 
may satisfy either or both of these first two rule 404(b) inquiries. Last, in 
determining whether prior bad acts evidence should be admitted, a "trial 
court must determine whether the bad acts evidence meets the requirements 
of rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence," which provides that relevant 
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evidence "'may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."' Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 
UT 59,120, 6 P.3d 1120 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 403). 
State v. Lowther, 2015 UT App 180, 1 9, 356 P.3d 173(emphasis added). The 404(b) 
evidence allowed by the trial court in this case cannot pass any of these tests. 
The Motion filed by the State relied upon a summary of a police report filed in 
an incident involving Camille Little. R.95, contained in Addendum F. It indicated that 
on October 28, 2008, Mr. Calvert called the police to report that he approached Little, 
told her to move, that she pushed and punched him, but she was drunk and fell on the 
ground. R.95. Little reported that he was taking pictures of her house, that she went 
outside he yelled at her, calling her names and "made threats at my life like always." Id. • 
He then attacked her, pushing her and hitting her twice in the head. Id. The State 
contended that this evidence was admissible for the purpose of rebutting the defendant's 
claims that the subject incident was fabricated, and Calvert's gun was pointed at Hugo 
Holguin inadvertently and in self-defense. R.96. The State further contended the 
evidence met all of the requirements of the "doctrine of chances" and that its probative 
value substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice per Utah R. Evid. 403. Id. 
Calvert filed an Opposition to the State's Motion. R.115-127. Calvert rebutted 
the State's claim of the alleged defense of fabrication, inter alia, on the basis that, the 
State actually sought to introduce the evidence in order to establish Mr. Calvert's 
"propensity to commit crime," an improper basis which outweighed any proffered 
• 
• 
legitimate purpose. R.117. A "trial court must first determine whether the bad acts • 
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evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as one of those 
e> specifically listed in rule 404(b ). " Lowther at 1 9. Although, fabrication is not listed in 
the Rule, it has been considered. See Lowther at 1 11 and Verde at 1 24. Calvert 
accurately asserted that the court must look past the purported basis set forth by the State 
and "evaluate the true purpose of evidence of past misconduct, determining at the 
threshold whether the evidence is presented for a proper purpose, or only for the purpose 
of suggesting an improper inference of action in conformity with alleged bad character." 
R.118, citing State v. Verde, 296 P.3d 673 at 124. 
Calvert addressed the State's "doctrine of chances" argument in detail. R.120-
• 125. Regarding the purported defense of fabrication, Calvert noted that the fabrication 
discussed in Verde related to a situation where the defendant completely denied that the 
incident occurred. R.118; See Verde, 296 P.3d at 19, ("Verde testified ... , denying that 
he ever sat next to N.H. on the couch or touched N.H. in a sexual manner."). Calvert's 
Opposing Memorandum stated that, 
• 
Defendant is not and has not denied that an altercation took place between 
himself and several individuals during the night in question. Neither has he 
suggested that any particular witness has fabricated the critical factual 
elements. While defendant does and will challenge the reliability of the 
government's theory and its own witnesses (who the government admits are 
unreliable) this is entirely different than 'fabrication' where the only 
evidence is two competing versions of events - with no outside witnesses. 
R.119. This argument alone should have barred admission of the Little evidence to 
counter the State's assertion of "fabrication." 
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As to the self-defense argument, Calvert distinguished the case cited by the 
government, State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, 318 P .3d 1151, wherein the defendant, 
Labrum, claimed he "instinctively hit" his wife with a Gatorade bottle "in self-defense." 
R.119 citing Labrum at ,r 23. The Court in Labrum explained that "other bad acts" 
evidence was introduced to explain why the victim "armed herself' and brought a 
weapon to bed. R.119. In Labrum the State sought to introduce evidence that the 
defendant had attacked his victim-wife three times previously in the prior eight months. 
Id. ,r 6. The prosecutor asked the wife why she felt it necessary to arm herself, and she 
gave voice to the prior incidents involving her and the defendant. Id. ,r 7. The Court of 
Appeals explained, 
The evidence of Labrum's prior acts of violence against Wife supports 
Wife's testimony that she armed herself with the keys to protect herself and 
not, as Labrum contends, to ambush Labrum when he came to bed. As the 
trial court noted, "The taking [ of] some type of a weapon to bed with 
someone has to be explained .... " Without an understanding that Wife had 
reason to fear Labrum, the State would be unable to explain why she 
brought the keys to bed and would be unable to challenge effectively 
Labrum's testimony that Wife was the aggressor and that he was merely 
defending himself. The other acts evidence was thus directly relevant to the 
contested issues of Wife's actions and state of mind and whether Labrum 
was acting in self-defense. 
Labrum at ,r 23. As Calvert observed, this is not analogous to the incident involving Ms. 
Little. R.120. 
Calvert further contested the State's argument that the evidence was necessary to 
counter the defense of accident or mistake by stating, that the defendant admitted having 
a gun with a laser to the police and gave them permission to retrieve it, that the State's 
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• 
witnesses had changed their positions and their stories were confused, and that the 
e defendant in any event did not intend to rely upon or assert the defense of mistake or 
inadvertence to the jury. R.119. In reviewing the trial testimony of Ms. Little, it is very 
difficult to determine how the incident would assist the State in overcoming such a 
defense of "accident or mistake" in any event. There simply is no relationship to the 
facts testified by Ms. Little and the incident in the instant matter. 
Even if deemed non-character evidence, however, next the court must determine 
whether the bad acts evidence is relevant under Utah R. Evid. 402. Lowther at ,I9. Did 
the Little incident have any, "tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would 
E; be without the evidence" and was her testimony of any "consequence in determining the 
• 
action." Utah R. Evid. 401. The incident, while demonstrating that Mr. Calvert 
previously got into a domestic dispute, was of no relevance to the instant situation. 
"Irrelevant evidence is not admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. It was thus inadmissible. 
The next question is whether the doctrine of chances "theory of logical 
relevance" can be demonstrated in this instance "on the objective improbability of the 
same rare misfortune befalling one individual over and over." Lowther at 19, citing 
Verde at 1 47. It is patently obvious that Ms. Little's irrelevant testimony, cannot 
demonstrate that such "rare misfortunes" befell Mr. Calvert "over and over." It was at 
best an unrelated isolated incident. It did not fit the premise of the "doctrine of chances." 
Finally, even if otherwise admissible, the trial court must determine if the 
evidence can withstand scrutiny under Utah R. Evid. 403. Lowther at 19. Utah R. Evid. 
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403 provides, inter alia, for the exclusion of relevant evidence, "if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury ... " State v. Castillo, 2007 UT App 324, ,6, 170 P.3d 1147. The 
prejudicial effect in this instance of evidence of the prior unusual, but hardly analogous, 
behavior of Mr. Calvert and surrounding circumstances so far outweighs its supposed 
probative value as to be "beyond the limits of reasonability." See State v. Downs, 2008 
UT App 247, ,r 6, 190 P.3d 17 citing State v. Castillo, Id., at ,r 6, quoting Diversified 
Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, ,r 6, 63 P.3d 686. 
The Court in Verde stated, 
Sometimes, however, the evidence in question has no legitimate 
narrative value, as in cases where it is not plausibly linked to any 
charged conduct. That will often be the case for evidence of prior 
misconduct. Such evidence may be worse than immaterial to a 
legitimate narrative. It may risk creating an alternative, illegitimate 
narrative-that the defendant has a reprehensible character, that he 
probably acted in conformity with it, and that he should be punished 
for his immoral character in any event. 
Id. at ,r 29( emphasis added). This is highlighted by observation made in State v. Shick/es, 
760 P.2d 291, discussed infra, that prior bad act evidence is "objectionable not because it 
has no appreciable probative value but because it has too much." Id., 295. Mr. Calvert's 
character was simply smeared by Little's testimony, creating an "alternative, illegitimate 
narrative," tending to show he likely acted in conformity with his reprehensible character. 
The evidence has too much probative value. 
At trial, Camille Little testified she was attacked by Mr. Calvert on Halloween 
night when they both lived in the same neighborhood in 2008. R.282:289-292. She 
32 
claimed that he had harassed her mother many times. R.282:293. As she walked outside, 
• he was right there, and grabbed and pushed her down, saying "crazy stuff," like "I will 
kill you" and swearing. R.282:293-294. She said I am calling the cops and he pushed 
her down again and he hurried and speeded out. R.282:293. On cross-examination she 
indicated that Calvert called the police as he pulled off and she went to the hospital. 
R.292:296. She saw no gun and didn't claim one was involved. Id. Charges were 
brought against her for domestic violence, and she counter charged. Id. All charges were 
• 
mutually dismissed. R.292:297. She claimed Calvert would say all kinds of strange 
things every time she saw him, and had threatened to kill her. Id. She herself never 
@ called the police. R.292:298. She claimed they moved from the neighborhood a few 
months later out of fear. R.292:299. 
• 
This evidence had an "unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or 
mislead the jury," and was inadmissible under Rule 403, State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, ,r 
25, 133 P.3d 363. It was sufficiently consequential that there was a reasonable likelihood 
"that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P .2d 116, 
120 (Utah 1989). Unfair prejudice within the context of Rule 403, as applicable to this 
case, involving evidence of a substantially unrelated incident, "means an undue tendency 
to suggest (a) decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an 
emotional one." Castillo, ,r 7, quoting from State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984. Thus, 
the Rule 403 focus under the doctrine of chances is "on the risk that the jury may draw an 
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improper 'character' inference from the evidence or that it may be confused about the 
purpose of the evidence." Lowther at 122, citing State v. Labrum, 2014 UT at 128. 
At the time of trial, it may not have been entirely clear what the state of the law 
was respecting the traditional method of weighing the probative value versus prejudicial 
effect of the evidence. Labrum at il 26. It stated that, "(where the context involves a 
doctrine of chances analysis, we read Verde as having displaced the Shick/es factors-for 
purposes of assessing the "probative value" aspect of the Rule 403 analysis-with a focus 
on materiality, similarity, independence, and frequency." Id. at il 28. Viewing the Little 
incident through the prism of the doctrine of chances, it is obvious that it does not apply. 
The entire concept of the "doctrine of chances" is that the chances of mistake in ~ 
admitting prior bad acts evidence decreases proportionately as the number of similar prior 
incidents increase. See Labrum i1 29. It can properly be used to rebut a charge of 
fabrication if it is grounded in the logical relevance theory of the "objective improbability 
of the same rare misfortune befalling one individual over and over." Verde at il 4 7. In 
application to the instant matter, given one isolated incident, the "chance" of making a 
mistake is no better than a coin toss. The doctrine is thus inapplicable on its face. 
The "doctrine of chances" requires a positive response relating to certain 
inferences: The inferences required follow this pattern: "evidence of prior similar 
tragedies or accusations;" "an intermediate inference that the chance of multiple similar 
occurrences arising by coincidence is improbable;" "and a conclusion that one or some of 
the occurrences were not accidents or false accusations." Id. il 50. Without going into 
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detailed analysis, it is plain that none of these inferences are satisfied by the Little 
@> testimony. First there is only one incident. Second, for the same reason, "the chance of 
multiple similar occurrences arising by coincidence" must be ruled out. And lastly, as the 
charges which were leveled at Mr. Calvert in the Little incident were dismissed by the 
State, State's Memorandum R.95, and the civil charges were mutually dismissed 
according to Little's own testimony, R.292:297, it is impossible to conclude that "one or 
some of the occurrences were not accidents or false accusations." Lowther at if 11 
quoting Verde at ilil 50-51. 
The Supreme Court, as correctly predicted by Labrum, did not abandon the 
Shick/es factors. State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, iJ 69 n.122, 349 P.3d 712, 734 referencing 
State v. Shick/es, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988), abrogated on other grounds by State 
v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). Those factors include, 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed 
between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative 
proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
Reece at iJ 69. Not all of those factors must be satisfied, only those relevant to the 
case at hand. Id. Thus applying the Shick/es factors to this case, first, it cannot be 
said that the Little testimony bore the kind of evidentiary strength one would hope 
for in overcoming the possible prejudicial effect. Secondly, there are virtually no 
similarities between the Little incident and the crime of which Calvert was 
convicted. The Little incident is entirely devoid of any circumstantial background 
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evidence, consisting essentially of an uncorroborated domestic kerfuffle between 
two people. There is absolutely no mention of Mr. Calvert having or brandishing 
a weapon of any kind during the Little incident. Third, there was considerable 
time between the incident in 2008 and the instant matter of 2012. Fourth, the State 
had little need for this prior incident. It called numerous witnesses, adult and 
child, in addition to Officer Jex. The Little testimony did no more than besmirch 
Mr. Calvert's character. It certainly added nothing by way of proof of the 
underlying allegation. The same can be said for the fifth factor, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, there being so many witnesses, contradictory though they may 
have been, against Mr. Calvert's sole testimony. The sixth and last factor, "the 
degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility," must be held against the State. While a bit bizarre, the Little testimony 
undoubtedly had an extremely negative impact upon the jury, rising to the level of 
"overmastering hostility." 
Admission of the prior assault was inflammatory and prejudicial, not probative 
of any necessary element of the alleged crime against Mr. Calvert, and tended to suggest 
a decision on an improper basis. 404(b) evidence is to be excluded if it has "an undue 
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an 
emotional one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror." State v. 
Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, ,r 36, 227 P.3d 1264. The evidence was not needed to 
establish the defendant's identity, his relationship to the alleged assault victim, Hugo 
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Holguin, and was totally unrelated to him and the allegation set forth in the Information. 
e Nor did it aid in establishing motive, design, intent, or any other such matter. It was 
essentially gratuitous, the sole purpose being to demonstrate Mr. Calvert's bad character. 
In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court decides 
"whether, as a matter of law, the trial court's decision that 'the unfairly prejudicial 
potential of the evidence outweighs [ or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was beyond 
the limits of reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) 
(internal quotations omitted). The trial court's decision to admit the evidence in this case 
was "beyond the limits of reasonability" and given its inherent volatility, the error was 
harmful. No rational juror could help but be impressed after hearing such evidence, that 
Calvert must simply be a bad, or perhaps crazy, man. "(T)he trial court must take special 
care in admitting evidence of a defendant's other bad acts." See State v. Marchet, 2009 
UT App 262, 144, 219 P.3d 75, 86, citing State v. Shick/es, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court appeared to give some analysis to the doctrine of chances. 
R.282: 12-30. It found that the State had established a doctrine of chances basis for the 
Little testimony, and that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. 
R.282:30. But for this reasoning was inaccurate. The court should have applied the 
Shick/es factors. However, based upon the record of the court's consideration of the 
evidence as a whole, R.282: 12-30, no such analysis is apparent. This Court has discussed 
the "scrupulous examination" which should attend a trial court's decision to allow or 
disallow prior bad acts evidence. 
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Because the record is devoid of any indication that the trial court undertook 
the scrupulous examination required, we conclude that it exceeded its 
discretion by admitting evidence of Ferguson's other bad acts under rule 
404(b). See State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ,r 16, 6 P.3d 1120 
(holding that the trial court has properly exercised its discretion if it 
scrupulously examined the admission of the other bad acts evidence); State 
v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ,r 11, 32 P.3d 976 (holding that the "failure 
of a trial judge to undertake a scrupulous examination in connection with 
the admission of prior bad act evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion"). 
State v. Ferguson, 2011 UT App 77, ,r 18. The record must demonstrate that the 
admission of other bad acts evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial judge 'in 
the proper exercise of that discretion."' State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 6 P.3d at ,r 16. 
Limited deference is accorded a trial court's decision to admit 404(b) evidence but only if 
• 
the evidence falls within the bounds marked by the legal standards set forth in the rules of fi 
evidence. State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,r 19, 296 P.3d 673. A scrupulous examination 
involves balancing the competing considerations. The obligation to conduct this 
scrupulous examination falls on the trial court. See Nelson-Waggoner, ,r 16; see also State 
v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ,r 18 & n. 2, 993 P.2d 837; and State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 
238, ,r 11, 32 P.3d 976. And that responsibility must be undertaken in a thoughtful and 
scrupulous fashion due to the important competing interests involved when other bad acts 
evidence is offered. Ferguson at ,r 2. 
A trial court is hard pressed to make such a scrupulous examination of the 
evidence without an evidentiary hearing. Without the benefit of knowing how a witness 
would actually testify, as opposed to the summarized police report proffered by the State, 
it is difficult to envision how the necessary pre-trial "scrupulous examination" can occur. 
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In virtually all of the cases discussing the application of Utah R. Evid. 404(b ), an 
evidentiary hearing has provided the factual basis for this Court's review. Yet neither the 
court nor counsel insisted that witnesses be called to testify, and the court heard counsel's 
arguments and made its ruling solely on the basis of the State's summary of a police 
report. R.282:6-30. 
Consequently, the trial court's process and conclusions did not flow from the 
"scrupulous examination" contemplated. Id. This in itself is error. For one example, this 
Court's most recent decision on the subject reversed because, "the trial court failed to 
scrupulously examine the proposed Rule 404(b) evidence in evaluating the evidence's 
admissibility under Rule 403." State v. Lowther at ,r 3 5. 
The factors used to weigh prejudice versus probative value include the Shickle 's 
factors previously mentioned. See State v. Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, ,r 36, quoting 
Shick/es, 295-296 (Utah 1988). Had the court scrupulously examined the Shick/es 
factors, it would have found that few, if any, lend support to its decision to admit the 
evidence. Moreover, to be admissible, such inflammatory evidence must have "special 
relevance." State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1990). The Little incident had no 
such "special relevance." 
Given all the circumstances, the aggravated assault and surrounding milieu was 
precisely the type of evidence which was likely to "rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility." State v. Reece, supra, at ,r 69. Given the relative strength of the other arguably 
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legitimate 404(b) evidence, the Little evidence was literally calculated to rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
The evidence was prejudicial, in the absence of which there may well have been a 
different result. "For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome 
must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). It is appropriate to recall that "[C]onfidence in the outcome 
may be undermined at some point substantially short of the 'more probable than not' 
portion of the spectrum." State v. Leber, 2010 UT App 387, ,r 10, 246 P.3d 163, quoting 
Knight at 920. As a result of the erroneous admission of this extrinsic bad act evidence, 
confidence in the verdict is sufficiently undermined that reversal is warranted. 
POINT IV 
IT WAS INNEFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND A COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF 
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL TO ALLOW THE STATE'S LAPTOP COMPUTER 
TO BE UTILIZED BY THE JURY DURING DELIBERATIONS. IT WAS A 
COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY TO 
ALLOW THE STATE'S LAPTOP COMPUTER TO BE UTILIZED BY THE 
JURY DURING DELIBERATIONS. THE ERROR CONSTITUTES A 
STRUCTURAL DEFECT FOR WHICH PREJUDICE NEED NOT BE SHOWN 
TO REQUIRE REVERSAL. BECAUSE THE ERROR WAS STRUCTURAL, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
ARREST JUDGMENT FOR GOOD CAUSE. 
During the presentation of the State's case, one of the witnesses, Araht Holquin, 
testified that he called the police. R.282:149. The 911 call was recorded and played for 
the jury. R.282: 150. The recording was identified and received as State's Exhibit 2. 
R.282: 157. At the close of the evidence and closing arguments, discussing the exhibits, 
the State indicated that Exhibit 2 is a CD. R.284: 146. At that point the State indicated, "I 
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have got a laptop if they - if they need it." R.284:147. Defense counsel was mute and 
e lodged no objection to the procedure. Id. 
After the verdict of guilty on both counts was returned, prior to sentencing, 
defense counsel made a Motion to Arrest Judgment. R.204-220. Defense counsel stated 
that he learned from courtroom observers several days after trial that the prosecutor's 
laptop was taken back to the jury room and remained throughout deliberations. R.209. 
Several exhibits, in the form of letters from attendees at the trial confirming the fact that 
the laptop was given to the jury were attached to the motion. R.215-218. Those exhibits 
are appended hereto as Addendum G. The motion further referenced an email from the 
€i> prosecutor indicating that the laptop had been taken back to the jury room, but that he did 
not know whether it had been used. R.209-210,219. The email from the State's 
Attorney, William Carlson, is attached hereto as Addendum H. 
The Motion to Arrest Judgment cited some Utah authority. For example, 
"The right to trial by a fair and impartial jury is an important one which 
should be scrupulously safeguarded." State v. Durand, 569 P .2d 1107, 
1109 (Utah 1977); art. one section 12 Utah Const. Unauthorized contact 
with the jury, particularly during deliberations, raises a presumption of 
prejudice and impropriety. See Glazier v. Cram, 71 Utah 465,267 Pac. 188 
( 1928) (because "it is probable that a doubt must and will continue to exist 
in the mind of the losing party and that of his friends as to whether or not 
he had a fair trial.") State v. Crank, 105 Utah at 268, 141 P.2d 178, 194 
(1943) ("in such instances the verdict of the jury, like Caesar's wife, must 
be above suspicion."). 
R.210. Defense counsel did not request an evidentiary hearing on the issue and none was 
had. 
The State opposed the Motion. R.222-228. The State took the position that the 
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mere possibility that the jury used a state supplied laptop to listen to a 911 call does not 
qualify as "good cause," as is required to arrest judgment under UT R. Crim. P. 24. 
R.226. The State asserted that it had made full disclosure to defense counsel that the 
laptop was being made available, that it offered the laptop to defense counsel to "check 
the laptop himself." Id. The State further reiterated that, "the mere possibility that a 
laptop could be abused to retrieve additional evidence if connected to the Internet does 
not justify abandoning a guilty verdict." R.227. 
At oral argument, defense counsel argued primarily that, sending such an 
extraneous item to the jury undermines all "notions of fairness," and "makes it impossible 
for the public to believe the jury is beyond reproach." R.283: 13-14. Neither the e 
prosecutor nor defense counsel was aware of the wi-fi capabilities of the laptop. 
R.283:19. 
The court, without evidence that any prejudice befell the defendant as a result of 
the jury using the laptop to play the 911 call, denied the defendant's Motion to Arrest 
Judgment. R.23 8 :21. 
The question of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the two-part test 
enunciated in Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The defendant is required 
to establish (1) "that counsel's performance was deficient," and (2) "that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense." State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ,r 16, (Utah, February 
2008) quoting Strickland at 687. As to the first prong of Strickland, 
The seriousness of those errors is measured by whether 
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard 
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of reasonableness." Specifically, " [a] convicted defendant ... 
must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged 
not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. 
(Footnotes omitted). 
State v. Eyre, at ,r 16, quoting Strickland at 687, 688. A defendant can be deprived of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel by a lawyer who simply fails to render 'adequate 
legal assistance'." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (internal quotations omitted). 
It is ineffective assistance of counsel to allow an extraneous prejudicial item to be 
i> allowed into the jury's deliberations without objection. The Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure prescribe what a jury may consider during the course of deliberations: 
Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions 
of the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except 
exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of 
the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The 
court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled 
to take notes during the trial and to have those notes with them during 
deliberations. As necessary, the court shall provide jurors with writing 
materials and instruct the jury on taking and using notes. 
Utah R. Crim. P. Rule l 7(l)(emphasis added). 
At least without some guidance from the court, providing an item not admitted in 
evidence to the jury is error. See State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 15 (Utah 1984)["While we 
are convinced of the commission of the asserted error (giving a portion of a witness 
deposition to the jury) ... " Counsel failed to object and the Davis Court held that 
defendant's failure do so precluded assertion of this error. Davis, 689 P.2d at 15. Here 
counsel allowed extraneous material to be introduced into deliberations which was error 
amounting to professional negligence. Counsel's performance "fell below an objective 
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standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668. 
The next question which must be satisfied is whether that negligence was subject Cl) 
to harmless error analysis. Some errors affect the criminal justice process so profoundly 
as to defy such analysis. Such defects constituting a constitutional deprivation "affecting 
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial 
process itself." Ariz. v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991). 
The deprivation of counsel during trial proceedings is a structural error. Johnson 
v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997). In the instant matter, 
counsel was either absent from the court room or paying so little attention, R.284: 146-
147, that his failure to object to the prosecutor's offer of his laptop to the jury constituted 
a total deprivation of the right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 
2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963). Again, it is difficult to imagine anything more inherently 
prejudicial being given to the jury than the State's laptop computer. It is an error so 
egregious as to constitute a complete deprivation of the right to counsel during a critical 
stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, it is a structural error. 
It is furthermore a deprivation of the right to an impartial jury. Based upon the 
Sixth Amendment made applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, "in the 
American States, as in the federal judicial system, a general grant of jury trial for serious 
offenses is a fundamental right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for 
assuring that fair trials are provided for all defendants." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 
145, 157-58, 88 S. Ct 1444, 1452, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 [1968]. "An error in the fundamental 
44 
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design of the jury mechanism "unquestionably qualifies as structural error." Lambright v. 
Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1191 (9th Cir. 1999). Denial of the right to a jury is a "structural 
defec[t] in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which deflies] analysis by 'harmless-
error' standards" under Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 
L.Ed.2d 302." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 US 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2079, 124 L. Ed. 2d 
182 [1993] ("A reviewing court in such a case can only engage in pure speculation-its 
view of what a reasonable jury would have done."). That is the circumstance in the 
instant matter. Allowing the State's laptop to be given to the jury was essentially an 
abdication of the role of both court and counsel in ensuring that and impartial jury would 
decide the case. It generated a defect in the "the fundamental design of the jury 
mechanism." Lambright, supra. It is difficult to imagine any more inherently prejudicial 
item or material being given to a jury than the opposing party's laptop computer. It is an 
error so egregious as to constitute a complete deprivation of the right to trial by jury at a 
critical stage of the proceedings. 
Without belaboring the point, for the reasons set forth, the trial court's failure to 
grant Mr. Calvert's Motion to Arrest Judgement for good cause, simply reinforced the 
structural error. A structural error is, by definition, not subject to harmless error analysis. 
A structural error is a "defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, 
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. 
This was a structural error, for which prejudice must be presumed and reversal 
granted. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the defendant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his convictions. 
SUBMITTED this /2.. day of~ ,2015. 
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SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
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CHADLEY KEITH CALVERT, 
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Clerk: casey~ 
Prosecutor: CARLSON, WILLIAM J 
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Case No: 121400830 FS 
Judge: MARK KOURIS 
Date: July 1, 2014 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PHILPOT, JAY M 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 4, 1969 
Sheriff Off ice#!: 156710 
Audio · 
Tape Number: 31 Tape Count: 1:37-2:03 
CHARGES I 
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not ~uilty - Disposition: 05/01/2014 Guilty 
2. THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS WEAPON IN FIGHT - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: -Not Guilty - Disposition: 05/01/2014 Guilty 
HEARING 
1:37 Counsel tlor the defendant motion to arrest judgment. 
1:48 Counsel ~or the state response. 
Jor 1:53 Counsel the defendant response. 
I 
1:56 The cour~ denies the motion. 
SENTENCE PRIS01'f 
Based on the d~fendant•s conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, 
1
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exce~d five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS 
WEAPON IN FIGHT!a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced 
to a term of 36$ day{s) The total time suspended for this charge 
is 275 day {s) . ! 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
NO GOOD TIME, NO EARLY RELEASE, NO ANKLE MONITOR. 
Charge# 1 
Charge# 2 i Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $1201.58 
Due: $2500.00 
Totai Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total surcharge: $1201.58 
Total Princip~l Due: $2500.00 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
I 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to!be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 90 day{s) jail. 
Defendant is tolpay a fine of 2500.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may inprease the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDifIONS 
No other violat~ons. 
Report to AP&P within 24 hours of release from jail. 
Enter into and pomplete any treatment recommended by AP&P. 
Notify the court of any address change. 
Not to possess 
1
or consume alcohol or non prescribed contol 
substances. . 
Random urinalys~s and drug testing as requested. 
Submit to searc~ of self or property by probation agent. 
Not to associa~~ with persons or frequent places where drugs or 
alcohol are solb. 
Submit to a me~tal health evaluation and complete any recommended 
treatment . _ I
No contact dir~ctly or indirectly with the victim. 
complete 50 ho~rs community service at the rate of 10 hours per 
month. The fi~st 10 hours will be due two months following 
release. ! 
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Results list 
• Previous Next • 
Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 17 
Copy Citation 
Current through rules effective as of November 1, 2015. 
Utah Court Rules STATE RULES UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17. The trial 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel. 
The defendant sha ll be personally present at the trial with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, the defendant may consent in writing to t r ial 
in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from 
the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried 
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been 
present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from t rial for good cause shown which may 
include tumu ltuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct . 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the 
defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order : 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
( 4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a j ury in open court with the 
approval of t he court and the consent of the prosecution . 
(d) All other cases shal l be t ried without a jury unless the defendant makes written demand at 
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(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and the approval 
of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a 
trial then in progress with any number of jurors less than otherwise required . 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the following order: 
{l) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may make an 
opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, 
otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the 
jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides without argument, the 
prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by 
responding to the defense argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of 
counsel for each party and the t ime to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror has been 
selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no alternate has been selected, the 
parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be 
discharged and a new trial ordered. 
(i) Questions by Jurors. -- A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a witness as 
provided in this section. 
(1) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the process to ensure 
the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an investigative 
body. The judge may disallow any question from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors 
at any t ime. 
(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the jurors that they 
may write the question as it occurs to them and submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to 
the j udge. The judge should advise the jurors that some questions might not be allowed. 
(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties and rule upon any 
objection to the question. The judge may disallow a question even though no objection is made• 
The judge shall preserve the written question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the ju 
shall ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The question may be 
rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to examine 
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G)- Wnen in tne opinion of tlie court it7s proper for tnEnury-toview ffie place in whicntlie offense 
is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it may order them 
to be conducted in a body under t he charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them 
by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while the 
jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak to 
them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the trial and to return them into court 
without unnecessary delay or at a specified t ime. 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered, 
t hey shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves or to 
converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the 
trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is fina lly 
submitted to them. 
(I) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all 
exh ibits wh ich have been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of 
the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband . 
The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes 
during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court 
shall provide j urors with writi ng materials and instruct the jury on taking and using notes. 
(m) When the case is fina lly submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some convenient 
place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise 
ordered by the court; Except by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall 
not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if t hey 
have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicat e to 
any person the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon . 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberat ion, if they desire to be informed on any point of law 
arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such 
request to the court. The court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in 
the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the 
j ury that no further instructions shal l be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in 
its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in 
which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a j ury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by the jury under 
the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. • 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at t he conclusion of all the eviden 
the court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon 
the ground that the ev idence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any 
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Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 23 
Copy Citation 
Current through rules effective as of November 1, 2015. 
Utah Court Rules STATE RULES UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, t he court upon its own initiative may, or upon 
motion of a defendant sha ll, arrest j udgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a 
publ ic offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of 
judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense 
charged is entered or j eopardy has attached, order a commitment until the defendant is charged 
anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be just and proper under the circumstances . 
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Utah R. Evid. Rule 404 
Copy Citation 
Current through rules effective as of November 1, 2015. 
Utah Court Rules STATE RULES UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE ARTICLE IV . 
RELEVANCE AND ITS LIMITS 
Rule 404. Character evidence; Crimes or other acts 
(a) Character evidence . 
(1) Prohibited uses. -- Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to 
prove that on a particu lar occasion the person acted in conformity with the character or t rait. 
(2) Exceptions for a defendant or victim in a criminal case. -- The following exceptions apply in a 
criminal case : 
(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant's pertinent trait, and if the evidence is 
admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it; 
(B) subject to the limitations in Rule 412, a defendant may offer evidence of an alleged v ictim's 
pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, t he prosecutor may: 
(i) offer evidence to rebut it; and 
(ii) offer evidence of the defendant's same trait; and 
(C) in a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer evidence of the alleged v ictim's trait of 
peacefu lness to rebut evidence that t he victim was the first aggressor . 
(3) Exceptions for a witness. -- Evidence of a witness's character may be admitted under Rules 
607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Crimes, wrongs, or other acts. 
(1) Prohibited uses. -- Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 
person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity 
with the character. 
(2) Permitted uses; notice in a criminal case. -- This evidence may be admissible for another 
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(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence that the prosecutor 
intends to offer at t rial ; and 
(B) do so before trial, or during trial if the court excuses lack of pretrial notice on good cause 
shown. 
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child-molestation cases. 
(1) Permitted uses. -- In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child molestation, t he 
court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other acts of child molestation to 
prove a propensity to commit the crime charged. 
(2) Disclosure. -- If t he prosecution intends to offer this evidence it shall provide reasonable 
notice in advance of trial, or during tria l if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown. 
(3) For purposes of this rule "ch ild molestation" means an act committed in relation to a chi ld 
under the age of 14 wh ich would, if committed in this state, be a sexual offense or an attempt to 
commit a sexual offense. 
(4) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 
404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence. 
History 
Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998; November 1, 2001; April 1, 2008; 
December 1, 2011 
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Copy Citation 
Current through rules effective as of September 1, 2015. 
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED STATE RULES UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES 
Rule 606. Juror's competency as a witness 
(a) At the trial. -- A juror may not testify as a witness before the other jurors at the trial. If a juror 
is called to testify, the court must give a party an opportunity to object outside the jury's presence. 
(b) During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment. 
(1) Prohibited testimony or other evidence. -- During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or 
indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the 
jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's 
mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror's affidavit 
or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters. 
(2) Exceptions. -- A juror may testify about whether: 
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention; or 
(8) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror. 
History 
Amended effective October 1, 1992; December 1, 2011 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101 
Statutes current through the 2015 General Session 
Utah Code Annotated > Title 76 Utah Criminal Code > Chapter 2 Principles of Criminal Responsibility 
> Part I Culpability Generally 
76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal responsibility. 
(1) 
(a) A person is not guilty of an offense unless the person's conduct is prohibited by law; and 
(b) 
(i) the person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with 
a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, as the definition 
of the offense requires; or 
(ii) the person's acts constitute an offense involving strict liability. 
(2) These standards of criminal responsibility do not apply to the violations set forth in Ttt1e 41, 
Chapter 6a, Traffic Code, unless specifically provided by law. 
History 
C. 1953, 76-2-101, enacted by L. 1973, ch. I 96, § 76-2-101~ 1983, ch. 90, § 1; 1983, ch. 98, § 1; 
2005. ch. 2, § 300. 
Utah Code Annotated 
Copyright© 2015 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNcxis Group. All rights reserved. 
Herschel Bullen 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid= I 0005 l 6&crid=a645 ... 
I of2 
Lexis Advance® 
Research 
Document: Utah Code Ann.§ 76-1-402 r •~:I Actions ... 
More ... 
Results list • Previous document I Next 
-------------
• Previous 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 
Copy Citation 
Statutes current through the 2015 First Special Session 
Utah Code Annotated Title 76 Utah Criminal Code Chapter 1 General 
Provisions Part 4 Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode - Included offenses. 
Next • 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out 
of a single crimina l episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a single crim inal 
episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under different provisions 
of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction 
and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the 
court otherwise orders to promote j ustice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for 
multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the j urisdiction of a sing le court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on 
the first information or ind ictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in t he offense charged but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) I t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish t he 
commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense 
charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
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_j rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense . 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or 
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense 
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict 
or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
History 
C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 2. 
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Copy Citation 
Statutes current through the 2015 First Special Session 
Utah Code Annotated Title 76 Utah Criminal Code Chapter 1 General 
Provisions Part 4 Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode - Included offenses. 
Next • 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a sing le criminal action for all separate offenses arising out 
of a sing le criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal 
episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under different provisions 
of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acqu ittal or conviction 
and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the 
court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for 
multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on 
the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense 
charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
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Jump To...,. ;court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless 
] rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense. 
(5} If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or 
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense 
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict 
or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
History 
C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 2. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE CHAPTER 10. OFFENSES 
AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, WELFARE, AND MORALS PART 5. WEAPONS 
§ 76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in fight 
or quarrel 
(1) As used in this section, "threatening manner" does not include: 
(a) t he possession of a dangerous weapon, whether visible or concealed, without additional 
behavior which is threatening; or 
(b) informing another of the actor's possession of a deadly weapon in order to prevent what the 
actor reasonably perceives as a possible use of unlawful force by the other and the actor is not 
engaged in any activity described in Subsection 76-2-402(2) (a) . 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 76-2-402 and for those persons described in Section 
76-10-503, a person who, in the presence of two or more persons, draws or exhibits a dangerous 
weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses a dangerous weapon in a fight or 
quarrel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) This section does not apply to a person who, reasonably believ ing the action to be necessary in 
compliance with Section 76-2-402, with purpose to prevent another's use of unlawful force: 
(a) threatens the use of a dangerous weapon; or 
(b) draws or exhibits a dangerous weapon. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES 
AGAINST THE PERSON PART 1. ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault If the person commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and uses: 
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (1) is a third degree felony, except under Subsection (2){b). 
(b) A violation of Subsection (1) that results in serious bodily injury is a second degree felony. 
History 
C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; 1989. ch. 170. § 
2; 1995. ch. 291. § 5; 2010. ch. 193, § 4. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2015 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
··-------•·••--···· ·-······1 
Jump To..- I ii... 121 i... D 
• 
11/11/201511:16AM 
Tab C 
2012 Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-506 
• 
https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid= 100051 o&cna=i., lHS ••• 
Lexis Advance• I 15) I 
Research 
More .... 
• Document: 2012 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 Actions .... 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
······ ------ ·- -·---·-- ---------------------------- --------·--- ·-·-- --
---------- ----·---
-----------------·-·-·· ----------·-- -··-·-
2012 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 
f ----- --· ·- ---···--·· - - --·•-
Copy Citation 
2012 Utah Code Archive 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE CHAPTER 10. OFFENSES 
AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, WELFARE, AND MORALS PART 5. WEAPONS 
§ 76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in fight 
or quarrel 
(1) As used in this section, "threatening manner" does not include: 
(a) the possession of a dangerous weapon, whether visible or concealed, without additional 
behavior which is threatening; or 
(b) informing another of the actor's possession of a deadly weapon in order to prevent what the 
actor reasonably perceives as a possible use of unlawful force by the other and the actor is not 
engaged in any activity described in Subsection 76-2-402(2)(a). 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 76-2-402 and for those persons described in Section 
76-10-503, a person who, in the presence of two or more persons, draws or exhibits a dangerous 
weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses a dangerous weapon in a fight or 
quarrel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) This section does not apply to a person who, reasonably believing the action to be necessary in 
compliance with Section 76-2-402, with purpose to prevent another's use of unlawful force: 
(a) threatens the use of a dangerous weapon; or 
(b) draws or exhibits a dangerous weapon . 
History 
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Uta/, Code Annotated > Title 76 Utah Criminal Code > Chapter l O Offenses Against Public Health, 
Safety, Welfare, and Morals > Part 5 Weapons 
76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in fight or quarrel. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) ··oangerous weapon" means an item that in the m~mner of its use or intended use is capable 
of causing death or serious bodily injury. The following factors shall be used in determining 
whether an item, object, or thing is a dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; and 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was exhibited or used. 
(b) "'Threatening manner" does not include: 
(i) the possession of a dangerous weapon. whether visible or concealed, without additional 
behavior which is threatening; or 
(ii) informing another of the actor's possession of a deadly weapon in order to prevent 
what the actor reasonably perceives as a possible use of unlawful force by the other and 
the actor is not engaged in any activity described in Subsection 76-2-402(2){a). 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 76-2-402 and for those persons described in Section 
Ei) 76-10-503, a person who, in the presence of two or more persons, and not amounting to a 
violation of Section 76-5-103, drn.ws or exhibits a dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening 
manner or unlawfully uses a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) This section does not apply to a person who, reasonably believing the action to be necessary 
in compliance with Section 76-2-402. with purpose to prevent another's use of unlawful force: 
(a) threatens the use of a dangerous weapon; or 
(b) draws or exhibits a dangerous weapon. 
(4) This section does not apply to a person listed in Subsections 76-10-523(1}(a) through (e) in 
performance of the person's duties. 
History 
C. 1953. 76-10-506, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, §_~76:-10-506; /992, ch. 101.~§_J_; 2010, dz. 361, 
LJ; L. 2014, ch. 248, § 1. 
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Annotations 
Notes 
Amendment Notes. -
The 2010 amendment, effective May 11, 2010, rewrote the section, which formerly read: 0 Every 
person, except those persons described in Se,;Jion 76- l0-5QJ, who, not in necessary self defense in the 
presence of two or more persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening 
manner or unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor." 
The 2014 amendment, effective May 13, 2014. added (I )(a) and (4); added "and not amounting to a 
violation of Section 76-5-103" in (2); and made related changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Aggravated assault. 
Evidence sufficient. 
Lesser included offenses. 
Aggravated assault. 
Aggravated assault, § 76-5-103, committed by use of a deadly weapon is not the same crime 
proscribed by this section, and a person convicted of aggravated assault is not entitled to receive the 
misdemeanor penalty provided by this section, but is to be sentenced under§ 76-5-103. State v. Verdin. 
595 P.2d 862 (Utah 1979) See alsoGreen v. Turner. 409 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1969) (same conclusion 
under former law). 
Defendant charged with aggravated assault committed by use of a deadly weapon, § 76-5-103, was 
entitled to a jury instruction regarding offense of threatening with a dangerous weapon as a lesser 
included offense where two offenses had overlapping elements, facts of case tended to prove both 
offenses, and evidence was subject to an interpretation which provided both a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting defendant of aggravated assault charge and convicting him of threatening with a 
dangerous weapon. State v. Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551. /984 Utah LEXIS 892 (Utah /984). 
Defendant, who was not a party to any fight or quarrel and did not merely draw or exhibit his gun but 
admitted firing it, was properly charged with aggravated assault under § 76-5-103 rather than under 
this section. State v. Quada. 291 Utah Adv. 26. 9/8 P2d 883. /996 Utah App. LEXIS 61 (Utah Ct. 
tUlllJ., cert. denied, 925 P.2d 963, 1996 Utah LEXIS 284 (Utah /996). 
A defendant convicted of aggravated assault for firing a pistol from a moving vehicle into another 
moving vehicle was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of threatening or 
using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, as at the time of the shooting there was no quarrel and 
the defendant did more than merely "draw and exhibit" his weapon. State v. Parra. 359 Utah Adv. 22. 
972 P2d 924. 1998 Utah App. LEXIS 124 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Herschel Bullen Page 2 of 3 
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Evidence sufficient. 
Ample evidence existed to support defendant's convictions. See State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, 
410 Utah Adv. 22, 15 P.3d 635, 2000 Utah App. LEXIS /02 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
Lesser included offenses. 
It was not plain error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the lesser included crime of 
threatening with a dangerous weapon when there was no request to do so by either party; defendant 
could have made a reasonable strategic decision not to instruct the jury on the crime of threatening with 
a dangerous weapon for fear that the jury might convict defendant of that crime if it was not able to 
agree that he was guilty of aggravated assault. State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52. 467 Utah Adv. 25. 65 
P.3d 648, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), aff'd in part and rev'd in par~ 2005 UT 57, 
533 Utah Adv. 57, 122 P.3d 615. 2005 Utah LEXIS 99 (Utah 2005). 
Research References & Practice Aids 
Cross-References. -
Aggravated assault. § 76-5-103. 
Am. Jur. 2d. -
79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons and Firearms§ 29. 
C.J.S. -
94 CJ .S. Weapons § 16. 
A.L.R. -
Stationary object or attached fixture as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating 
offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide, 8 A.L.R.5th 775. 
Hierarchy Notes: 
Utah Code Ann. Title 76 
Utah Code Annotated 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE CHAPTERS. OFFENSES 
AGAINST THE PERSON PART 1. ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and uses: 
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (1) is a third degree felony, except under Subsection (2)(b). 
(b) A violation of Subsection (1) that results in serious bodily injury is a second degree felony. 
History 
C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; 1989, ch. 170, § 
~; 1995, ch. 291, § 5; 2010. ch. 193, § 4. 
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Copy Citation 
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Utah Code Annotated Title 76 Utah Criminal Code Chapter 5 Offenses Against the 
Person Part 1 Assault and Related Offenses 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault - Penalties. 
(1) Aggravated assault is an actor's conduct : 
(a) t hat is: 
(i) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(ii) a t hreat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(iii) an act, committed with unlawful force or v iolence, that causes bodily injury to another or 
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another; and 
(b) that includes t he use of: 
(i) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(ii) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) 
(a) A violat ion of Subsection (1) is a third degree felony, except under Subsection (2)(b). 
(b) A violation of Subsection (1) that results in serious bodily injury is a second degree felony. 
History 
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3, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; 1989. ch. 170, § 2; 
1995, ch. 291, § 5; 2010, ch. 193. § 4; L. 2015, ch. 430, § 2. 
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0000067 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Assault'' is: 
(a) an attempt, with m1lawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
{b) a threat; accop-1pl:lnied by a show of immediate force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another; or 
( c) an act, committed with unlawfu_l fore~ Qr viQ.lence, tha..t causes 
bodily :injury to ariother. 
"Unlawful or unlawfully" meiµIS that which is contrary to law or unauthorized by law, or, 
without legai justification, or~ illegal. 
\ 
INSTRLl'CTION NO. . 
...... , ...... ,:•.--. ··--
"D~gereus w:eap<:>n,,. means::any item c~pable. of causing death ,or.serfous·bodiiy-'inj)u.y~ 
! 
@. 
0000070 
1lN$T.RtJ.CtlON NO. __ 
0000071 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before.you can convicttne defend~t, Chadley Keith Calvert, ofthecrime-of Aggravated 
Assault, as ;charged in Count I of the informatioQ, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, each: and every one of the following elements of that offense 
occurring on or before the 16th day of July, 2012, in Salt Lake County, State 9f Utah; 
1. '. That the defendant, Chadley Keith Calvert committed an act of assault upon Hugo 
Holguin; and 
2. That such attempt or act was committed intentionally or knowingly; and 
3. Tbatthe defendant used a dangerous weapon. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, -you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond .a reasonable doub~. then yeti must. 
find the defendant-guilty of Aggravated Assault as charged in Count 1 of the information. If~ on 
the other h~d, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of -any one or more .of the 
foregoing elementst then you mustf"m.d the defendant noi guil_ty of Count I. 
000007·4 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Under the law of the State of Utah a person is -guilty of threatening or using a dangerous 
weapo11 in a fight or qµarrel if, in the presence-of two or ~qre persons·, he/she draw$ .gr exhi1J_it$ 
any danger<>us weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses the same in any 
fightor quarrel. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the ·.State is not required to prove that the weapon was loaded or 
capable of firing in order to establish that the defendant is guilty c;,f threatening with a dangerous 
weapon . 
0000076 
............ ·-.. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant, Chadley Keith Calvert, of the offense of 
Threatening With or Usin.g a Dangerous Weapon in a Fight or Quarrelt as,charged in Count II of 
the information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and 
every one of the following elements of that offense, occurring on or about the 16th day of July, 
2012, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
1. That the defendant, Chadley Keith Calvert was in the presence of two or more 
people; and 
2. Drew or exhibited any dangerous weapont to wit: a handgun; and 
3. (a) Did so in an angry or threatening manner, or (b) unlawfully used the same in 
any fight or quarrel 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Threatening With or Using a Dangerous Weapon in a Fight or 
-Quarrel, as charged in Count II of the inf onnation. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty of Count II. . 
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Instruction No. · \ct 
If the evidence supports an affirmative defense, the State has the burden to 
prove beyond· a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. 
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INSTRUCTIONNO. 1o 
A p*tson ~ justified in threatening or using force agains:t anotlier when :and. to the ~xtent 
i 
that. he reasonably believes: thal such force. is necessary to defend lmnselt .ol' a tliir.d p.erson 
! 
a~ainst S\U,i*•Qther~'. imminent µ$e. of unlawf:ul fore~; 'however a· ~rJon-is jµstjfied -in 1:1Sing· force 
which is inMidoo· at likely to. cause death -or serious bodily injuzy oidy·jf:he .~onably bmiev~~ 
' . 
fllat;~ f~:~- .n~ssaey ~- prevent death or serious bodily injury to bimself .or. a tlilrd ;p.erson, 
;i 
or·preveiit ~e commission ·of a forcible. felony. 
¢tson: 
A p~sQn is not justifi~d in using force under the· circumstances specified. above· if that 
a) .inftially pro.vokes tlie use of force against himself 'Willi ·the :intent to use 
.fur.c;e 8$.='srt,etctl$¢ to irtfUqt bo~ily ~ upon the ~~ant; ·or 
L) -is attempting. to- commit, c.animitting, or fleeing ·after the commission or 
I 
~• P.ted commission of~ felony; or 
: ~) was tbe. aggres.sor or was ~ngage.d -in a c·ombJt,. by agteem;~nt~ unle.ss .he 
with~ws from- .the encounter and. ·effectively communicates to sueh other- person his 
mtetjt JO.do: so, ~the other no~g-cc;,ntill~!i'or ~~'to' (lQntq)U¢~~ of 
tinla~ .force. 
"Ifi d~nins tb.e·lirunin~nce or reasonablen.eS.$ of~-Qf forc;se,;y.ou may consider~•but 
i 
I 
~e 119t limi.t'ed.to,_:any-of 11;le follawing. factors: I . . 
I 
a) ihe nature:.ofthe·danger; 
.b) 'lthe immediacy of the :d~~er; 
.c;} lll,.~ .proq~tity tha~ the unlaw.ful force· would resµlt in. d"¢.'atij·qr :s~rlo'1S po-qily i~Jµry; 
d) The other's prior vioient.acts or violent propensities; 
·' 
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Instruction No._1,_1 __ 
(1) A person is justified in using force against another when and to the extent that 
he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the 
other's unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation; however, he is justified in 
the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury 
only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he reasonably believes that the entry is 
attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal 
violence to any person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he reasonably 
believes that the force is necessary to prevent the ass_ault or offer of personal 
violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the 
purpose of committing a felony in the habitation and that the force is 
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force in defense of habitation is presumed for 
the purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have acted reasonably and had a 
reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury if the entry or 
attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of force, or in a violent 
and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or for the purpose of 
committing a felony. 
• 
• 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1,~ 
"Assault" is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
( c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to 
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
"Unlawful or unlawfully" means that which is contrary to law or unauthorized by law, or 
without legal justification, or illegal. 
0000195 
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i INSTRUCTION NO .. l~ 
ij·efJ,re::yQµ ~ ~Qnv.i~t the\defendant, Chadley Keith'Calve1' el\tliecmne·:0.f Aggravated 
Assault,. M:-jc:harged. in Col.Ult I ·-of th~ informati<m, yQu n;,.ust find• fr.pm d. c,f .the. e~~:anc;~ :@Ild 
beyond a *asonable doubt~ eaeh: .and ev.ery one of the following elements <if that offeris.e 
J ' 
o.¢.eur;d.ng-0111>rb.e.fo~ the t6.tll: d.a¥ Qf July,:2Qt2,in SJl}t.Lake Co\lllty, Jtate ofl)~; 
1. J Thatthe.de~endmt, Chadley Keith:Clllvertcoinmitttd an act ofassault upon Hqgo. 
a,Jg$.,-and 
Thit .such attempt or act was com.mitted intentionally .:or knoWing_ly; and 
3. T.hat.:the·defendant used a dangereus weapon. 
lf, .aer ear¢ful consider.atign· of all .. Qf'the·evidenc.e in this ease.;: .. you: at~ ·c9·nvblced .. of'the 
truth of.each and every one of the foregoi.ng ·e1ements beyond ·a reasonable do:U:b~ ·then you must 
fin.(l ~ 6efim&iw_;gpilty .of Aggravated A.s$~ult-as ~hargc;cl.Jtt Count J .<>f 'tb~ in.iannatfon~ Ji~ on. 
' . . 
the ·other. iiJnci,: you are not -cb.n:v.irice,f: .beyond. a ·reasdnabie doubt. of-any one of riiore :of .the-
furegoing e~ ~ you mJJSt fiJ:!d the~el!da!tt not guilty of CAAtit. i. 
0000196 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1'? 
Und~ the law :ofthe State of Utah a person is guilty of tmeat~riin.~ .<Sr using a da1.1geious. 
we.apot.r m :it~!htr>r mwr~.l if, itt:tlte prese~c~ ·o.f tw<in,r··:more. P\:t.SP~~, :~~t~he :draw.~ -Qr :eid)i'bj~ 
" ) . . 
I 
.any dai,g~~~ ·w,~,.PQI;t iQ -an ~gry- aµd threatening .manne.r or unlawfully uses tbe· same~·in ·any. 
! 
! 
fight-or ctuatr.ei 
l 
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lNSTRUCH.ON-NO. ~1-
B~~ yo.u can convict. the .defendant, .Chadley- Keith. Calvert, of the offense of 
I 
Tht-eatenitlg. With gt U.$lng a P.angerQUS W~poll in,;S. Fight. Qr. Qµatrel, q,·charged it?-,:C~t Il :of 
:fhe mforma~en,.you m~- find from all of.the evidence· mid beyond -a reasonabl~· do:ubt each and 
'evetr- on~ ?f tfie. follPwing elem.ents of that pffense, occl.UTi.n:g pn .or e},qq_t. the I.6th day. :of J\tly, 
·:2012 iri:Sait t~ c~·-. ·:tv .State ·o-r'O+G'-'·~ 
. , .. ·~ . ! . . Q,lJll'. .. , f. . . Ula&; 
l. ; ThaUhe .. defendant, Chadle.y Keith Calvert was in the-presence of two or·m~re 
·p.e.ople~ an4 
2. 'Drew or-exlubited any dangerous weapon; to wit: a handgun; and 
l. 1 .(a.} I)id so ~-an. angry or .tlu'eatening manner, or (b) .unlawfully used· the same in 
=any-fight er qumteL 
. . l 
I . ---~ rt;· ~~-~~M .. cqnsj~~tjQn of all :of the ·evid.cm~ Jn. tQi$.: ~,. Yoif ar~ ton:vin~~-Xlf the 
truth;.,of ea~ and ~veryiolie of the (oregoing: elements beyond a.teasonabie ,doubt, ·then yeu must 
. . 
i 
find the d¥'endant ·guilty of Threale$g: With or J,Jsing .a I)angero11$· ·Weap~~ ~ a P;i~ or 
I 
~I; :as, :Qbarg~d]n Count Il ·of":the iinfol'JIUltion. .If, .on. the other hand,.. you are not convinced 
I • 
I 
i~y.oiid a r~asonablc·do:uot-o:f'any'.One·or more-ofthe:foregoing. elemenis, ~en.y.gu mll$t ~d ~e 
I 
.defendant "1t-guilty pf.'.Goun~ If ... 
0000199: 
Tab F 
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Another neighbor, Keith Majors, completed a written statement which indicates on the 
date in question he heard people shouting outside and when he looked out of his window he saw 
"a red lazer pointer moving around on the ground." After Majors saw the laser, Defendant 
" ... called me and said please come out I have a situation and I am going to go get my gun ... " 
When Majors went outside, he told Holguin and his relatives to go home. At that point, police 
arrived. 
Holladay 
According to Unified Police Report #2008-95235 in 2008 Defendant and Camille Little 
were neighbors on Fieldcrest Lane in Holladay. On October 28, 2008 Defendant called police to 
report that he approached Little and told her to move. Little tried to push and punch him, but that 
she was drunk and had fallen on the ground. Officer Michael Child of Unified Police reported to 
the scene and spoke to Little, who stated she had just come home when Defendant "made threats 
at my life like always." Little went inside her home, but when she noticed Defendant outside 
taking pictures, she went back outside. At that point Defendant was "yelling at her 'you stupid 
bitch.'" According to Little, he then attacked her, pushing her and hitting her twice in the head. 
Defendant was charged by an information with Assault in Holladay Justice Court case 
081000542. Defendant pled not guilty and the case was dismissed on February 6, 2009 on the 
Holladay prosecutors' motion . 
West Valley City 
According to West Valley Police Report 99-41265, in 1999 Defendant and Pat Wall were 
neighbors on Oxford Way in West Valley City. On or about August 1, 1999 Wall reported to 
police that Defendant drove his car directly toward Wall's stopped car and swerved out of the 
3 of 17 
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From: ru4eton <ru4eton@gmail.com> 
Subject: Fwd: statement 
Date: May 15, 2014 6:34:40 PM MDT 
To: crf@jmphilpot.com 
---------- Forwarded message---------
From: "shaun harris11 <Shaun.harris1 o2@gmail.com> 
Date: May 15, 2014 6:02 PM 
Subject: statement 
To: <ru4eton@gmail.com> 
Cc: 
I was in attendance during the trial of Chad Calvert. This is my statement of the 
events that took place with the Prosecutor's laptop that I witnessed . 
It was the end of the trial and the judge had already dismissed the jurors for 
deliberation. The prosecutor asked the court clerk if the 911 CD audio had been 
submitted into evidence. The court clerk said that it was. Mr Philpot, the defense 
attorney, had asked the prosecutor to confirm that the 911 audio was the only thing 
on that disk. The prosecutor confirmed that the 911 audio was all that was on the 
CD. The prosecutor then asked the bailiff if the jurors had a way to play the audio as 
they deliberated. The bailiff told the prosecutor he would find out and at that point the 
prosecutor offered his laptop to the jurors. After the verdict was read the bailiff was 
standing in front of the galley waiting for everybody to leave. The prosecutor was 
sitting at his table also waiting and he asked the bailiff if he could have his laptop 
back. The bailiff told him that he had to wait until we all left the courtroom before he 
could go back to the jury room to get the laptop. 
Best regards, 
Shaun Harris 
A 1 Industrial Supply 
801.652.8785 
0000216·· 
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To whom it may concern, 
My wife Mfchelle Guest, and myself, Denny .P. Guest Jr. attended the triaJ and verdict hearing of my 
cousln Chad. IC, Calvert cm AprU 30, 2014 and May 1, 2014 Jn West Jor-don, UT- We were In attendance 
when. the verdict was read. Right after the v.erdlct was read we .both witnessed that the court bailiff 
walked over to the prosecuting attorney and asked if he needed .anything else as he was not exiting the 
courtroom. The prosecuting attorney stated he needed hf~, computer. The bailfff said he would get It for 
hfm and exited threugh the door that the-Jury went Into. We then exited the courtroom. This Is our 
reeoUection and statement. 
4~~/4 
DennyP.GuestJr ~ 
--Jr/~~ 
Michelle c. Guest 
0000217 
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Tab H 
From: Morgan Philpot [mailto:imorganphilpot@gmail.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2014 12:25 PM 
To: William Carlson 
Subject: Calvert Case 
Will, 
I have had some conversations and need to clarify a few things. SpecJfically, I need to know that only the 911 call went 
back to the Jury room and that your laptop did not go back to the jury room? 
Thanks, 
Morgan Philpot 
Attomey for Chad calvert 
f801) 891-4499 mobile. 
From: Morgan Philpot <jmorganphilpot@gmail.com> 
Subject: Fwd: Calvert Case 
Date: May 13, 2014 12:31 :56 PM MDT 
To: Rick Franklin <crf@jmphilpot.com> 
---------- Forwarded message---------
From: WIiiiam Carlson <WCarlson@slco.org> 
Date: Tue, May 13, 2014 at 12:30 PM 
Subject: RE: Calvert Case 
To: Morgan Philpot <jmorganphilpot@gmail.com> 
Morgan, 
Only the one 911 call from Araht went back, not the other two 911 calls. I left the 
office laptop (it is not my laptop and does not have any of my files or email on it) in 
the courtroom while the Jury deliberated in case it was needed, which we had 
discussed doing before we left the courtroom. When we were called back for the 
verdict, the laptop had been taken into the back. I do not know whether the jury used 
it to listen to the cd or the bailiff had just taken it in back in case they needed it. 
6J#ii • .,,J. ~~ 
Deputy District Attomey 
Justice Division 
West Jordan Courthouse 
8080 South Redwood Road, Suite 1100 Tel (385) 468-7546 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 Fax(385)468-7549 
www di3trfctqttqrnev s{co,org WCarlson@slco, o,;g 
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